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that the vehicle itself is defective-either in its
performance, construction, components, or materials. Thus, the Government had to demonstrate that the incidents of skidding occurred
under circumstances in which, absent a defect,
they would not have otherwise occurred. The
Court of Appeals held that the consumers were
not capable of determining whether the incidents they had experienced would not have
occurred otherwise. The court did not hold,
however, that consumer-complaint evidence
alone could never suffice to demonstrate a
defect under the Act. Instead, the court limited
its decision to the facts of this case, in which
consumer-complaint testimony did not prove a
defect.
In addition to the consumer complaints,
NHTSA also relied on the relative complaint
rates for X-cars and for other cars to show that
the X-cars were defective. NHTSA claimed the
different complaint rates indicated that the Xcars, rather than other factors, were responsible
for the skidding. The Court of Appeals rejected
this argument because the number of complaints for the model X-cars was probably increased by the excessive publicity surrounding
them. According to the court, the film clip
which described the X-car was witnessed by
approximately 53 million viewers, and follow-up
newspaper and television stories added to the

public's awareness. As evidence that this publicity affected the complaint rate, the court noted
that GM and NHTSA received more complaints
during the two weeks following the release of
the film clip than they had in the previous 31/2
years. Thus, GM was able to explain the high rate
of complaints by reference to a factor other than
vehicle malfunction. As a result, the skidding
experienced by consumers was not linked to any
malfunction in GM's model X-cars.
Finally,the Government objected to GM's use
of test data to rebut the Government's evidence
of a defect. According to the Government, GM
could rebut the Government's evidence in only
two ways: 1) by showing that any failure in the
braking system resulted from gross and unforeseeable owner abuse or neglect; or 2) by showing that any failure in the braking system occurred in non-dangerous situations. The court
rejected this contention. Instead, the Court of
Appeals held that the test data was relevant to
show that the skidding could have been caused
by factors other than vehicle malfunction, and
that GM's X-car was no more likely to experience skidding than other cars. The court also
rejected the Government's claim that the tests
used by GM were unrepresentative, and affirmed the trial court's judgment in favor of GM.
Peggy Healy

FEDERALLY INSURED STATE
CHARTERED MINNESOTA
BANKS MAY CHARGE 21.75
PERCENT INTEREST ON
AGRICULTURAL LOANS
WITHOUT VIOLATING STATE
USURY LAWS

each case, the Minnesota bank charged higher
interest rates on agricultural loans than on other
loans. The plaintiffs sued the banks for violation
of the state usury laws. In three cases, Vanderweyst, Walsh, and Heimark, the actual interest
rates ranged from 11.85% to 16%; in Bandas, the
plaintiff alleged the bank charged 51.52% interest.
The borrowers contended that: (1) the federally insured, state chartered banks do not have
"most favored lender" status; therefore, the
banks do not have a choice between interest
rates under 12 U.S.C. § 1831d(a); and, (2) under
Minnesota law, the maximum interest rate that a
lending institution can charge on agricultural
loans is 4.5% in excess of the prevailing federal
discount rate. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 334.011 (West 1981
& Supp. 1988).
The banks responded that pursuant to their
"most favored lender" status under federal law,
12 U.S.C. § 1831d(a), they are allowed to charge
the highest interest rate permitted by Minnesota
law. According to Minnesota law, industrial loan
and thrift institutions can charge 21.75% on agricultural loans; consequently, federally insured,
state chartered banks are also authorized to
charge 21.75% on agricultural loans. MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 53.04 (West 1988). In all four cases, the trial

The Minnesota Supreme Court in Vanderweyst v. First State Bank of Benson, 425 N.W.2d
803 (1988), held that pursuant to federal law, 12
U.S.C. § 1831d(a) (1982), state chartered, federally insured banks have "most favored lender"
status and can charge interest on agricultural
loans at the highest rate available to any competing lender under state law. As a result, banks
could charge up to 21.75 percent on agricultural
loans without violating Minnesota's usury laws.
Federally Insured, State Chartered Banks Have
"Most Favored Lender" Status
The Minnesota Supreme Court consolidated
four cases for appeal: Vanderweyst v. First Bank
of Benson, 408 N.W.2d 208 (Minn. App. 1987);
Walsh v. First Bank of Pennock (and Heimark v.
Norwest Bank Montevideo), 409 N.W.2d 5 (Minn.
App. 1987); and Bandas v. Citizens State Bank of
Silver Lake, 412 N.W.2d 818 (Minn. App. 1987). In
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courts held that because the 21.75% interest rate
was allowed by state law, the banks were not
guilty of usury. The Minnesota appellate court
affirmed and the cases were consolidated on
appeal to the state supreme court.
The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed all
four decisions, holding that the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act
of 1980 ("the Deregulation Act"), bestows most
favored lender status on federally insured state
chartered banks. 12 U.S.C. § 1831d (1982). Interpreting the legislative history, the court determined that Congress intended to give insured
state banks the same advantages enjoyed by
their national competitors, including the privileges concerning interest rates. Section 1831d(a)
of the Deregulation Act specifically allows banks
the choice of charging interest at a rate of either
"not more than 1 per centum in excess of the
discount rate on ninety-day commercial paper.. .or.. .the rate allowed by the laws of the
State,...where the bank is located, whichever
may be greater."
The Highest Rate a Bank May Charge is21.75 Per
Cent
The court next considered what rate banks
with most favored status may charge under
Minnesota law. The court noted § 334.011 allows
a lending institution to charge interest at a rate
not more than 4.5% in excess of the federal discount rate on a loan less than $100,000 for business or agricultural purposes. Section 53.04,
however, enables industrial loans and thrifts to
charge either the rate provided by § 334.011, or
instead, 21.75% interest per year.
The court stated that when two statutes are in
irreconcilable conflict, the special provision shall
prevail over the general, unless the general provision was enacted at a later date and the legislature clearly intended that the general provision
shall prevail. Because § 53.04 was enacted later
than § 334.011 and had been amended more
frequently and more recently than § 334.011, the
court concluded that the legislature intended §
53.04, dealing with loans in general, to control
over § 334.011, dealing specifically with agricultural loans. Consequently, the floating rate under § 334.011 is not an exclusive rate for agricultural loans for all lenders under Minnesota law.
A 21.75% interest rate may be charged by industrial loans and thrifts for agricultural loans.
Therefore, federally insured, state banks with
"most favored lender" status may also charge
21.75% interest.
Banks did not Violate Minnesota State Usury
Laws
The court next addressed whether the loans
were in violation of the state usury laws due to

the banks' failure to comply with regulations
regarding industrial loans and thrifts. The court
held that the licensing requirements for an
industrial loan and thrift are not material to the
determination of the interest rate, and that the
most favored lender doctrine only adopts the
state's usury laws insofar as they fix the interest
rate. The banks are therefore subject to regulations that are material to the determination of
the interest rate. A provision is material if: 1) it
pertains to the manner in which the numerical
rate of interest is calculated; or 2) it defines the
class of loans in such a way (as by size, type of
borrower, or maturity) as to effect the borrowed
interest rate.
The court rejected the borrowers' argument
that the statutory prohibitions against loansplitting and charging attorney fees are material
to the determination of the 21.75% interest rate
and therefore applicable to the most favored
lenders. The court stated that these prohibitions
apply only to loans made pursuant to § 56.131.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 56.131 (West 1988). Because the
loans made by the most favored lender banks
were not made under § 56.131, the prohibitions
against loan-splitting and charging attorney fees
were not applicable. Consequently, there was
no violation of Minnesota usury laws.
Justice Wahl concurred in part and dissented
in part. He took issue with the majority's conclusion that federally insured, state chartered banks
were authorized to charge 21.75% interest on
agricultural loans. Under § 334.011, the legislature had mandated that the maximum interest
rate on agricultural loans be no more than 4.5%
in excess of the federal discount rate. Justice
Wahl disagreed with the majority's interpretation of this section and of § 53.04. When two
statutes conflict, Justice Wahl stated that the
proper procedure is to give effect to both, if
possible, before deciding which provision prevails. Section 53.04 states that industrial loans
and thrift companies may make loans with certain ceilings as provided by § 334.011, or in lieu
thereof, at the rate of 21.75%. According to Justice Wahl, this provision should be construed to
mean that industrial loan and thrift companies
generally may charge up to 21.75%, unless §
334.011 specifies a different rate on particular
types of loans. Interpreted in this manner, the
two statutes are not in conflict.
He concluded that this construction avoids
conflict between the two statutes because only
one provision would apply to a particular loan.
Justice Wahl added that it is highly unlikely that
the Minnesota legislature intended § 53.04 to
circumvent the reach of §334.011's interest ceiling on agricultural and business loans. It would
be more reasonable to conclude that the legislature desired § 53.04 to require compliance with

the rate ceiling in § 334.011 on agricultural loans.
Consequently, the highest rate a "most favored
lender" state bank could charge pursuant to §
334.011 on agricultural loans would be no more
than 4.5% in excess of the federal discount rate.
John Joyce

DISPOSAL OF TOXIC CHEMICALS
HELD TO BE AN ABNORMALLY
DANGEROUS ACTIVITY
MANDATING STRICT LIABILITY
In T& EIndustries v. Safety Light Corp., 227 N.J.
Super. 228, 546 A.2d 570 (N.J. Super. 1988), a New
Jersey appellate court determined the scope of
the liability of a manufacturer who disposed of
hazardous waste on its former property. The
court found the former property owner strictly
liable to the successor in title who purchased the
property without knowledge of the danger. The
court held the resulting damages were proximately caused by the former owner and foreseeability was irrelevant. Further, the former
owner could not rely on the doctrine of caveat
emptor ("let the buyer beware") to avoid liability.
The United States Radium Corporation
("USRC") owned a plant in Orange, New Jersey.
Between 1917 and 1926, USRC extracted from
carnotite ore radium which was used for various
commercial purposes. The processing yielded a
solid waste known as "tailings" which were
dumped on vacant areas of the property. Both
radium and radium tailings are known carcinogens, posing a threat to human health.
In 1926, USRC closed its Orange plant site. The
plant remained vacant until it was leased to
commercial tenants in the mid-1930s. In 1943,
the property was purchased by one former
tenant. The purchaser was aware of the radium
deposits at the time of purchase but did not
regard the condition as dangerous. Consequently, the purchaser made an addition to the
plant over the area contaminated with radium
tailings. After a succession of owners, the site
was sold in 1974 to the plaintiff, T & E Industries
("T & E").
In March of 1979, the New Jersey Department
of Environmental Protection ("DEP") voiced
concern about the possibility of an excessive
level of radiation on T & E's property. Long-term
monitoring equipment revealed radium levels
sufficient to constitute a health risk. In response
to DEP's request for remedial action, T & E hired
a health physicist who implemented a variety of
safety measures. In addition, T & E conducted
independent testing which revealed that an

Editor's Note: On November 7,1988, the United
States Supreme Court denied the petition for
writ of certiorari. 57 U.S.L.W. 3333 (U.S. Nov. 7,
1988) (No. 88-591).

assembly area worker at the plant would be
exposed to the maximum statutory level of
radioactive material within 3.18 years. It became
clear that removing the contaminated soil under
and around the building was the only way to
render the building safe. When this measure was
rejected as too costly, T & E relocated to a new
facility.
T & Esued Safety Light Corporation and other
successor corporations of USRC for property
damages resulting from radium contamination.
The complaint alleged absolute liability, nuisance, negligence, misrepresentation and fraud.
T & E sought compensatory and punitive damages, as well as reimbursement for the cost of
decontaminating its property. USRC was charged
with originally dumping the radioactive waste
on the property.
The trial court granted T & E's pretrial motion
for partial summary judgment, holding that
USRC had in fact placed the radium tailings on T
& E's property. T & E proceeded to try its case
relying on the court's apparent decision that the
issue of absolute liability was decided in its favor.
However, after T & Epresented its evidence the
trial court granted USRC's motion to dismiss T &
E's absolute liability claims, contrary to its previous order. In addition, the trial court dismissed
T & E's claims of fraud, misrepresentation, reckless conduct, and punitive damages, leaving
only the negligence claim.
The court instructed the jury to determine,
among other things, whether USRC was negligent in its failure to warn T & E of a potential
health risk, and whether that negligence was a
proximate cause of T & E's damages. The jury
found that USRC had been negligent and that
this negligence had proximately caused T & E's
damages. However, the trial judge granted
USRC's motion to set aside the jury verdict on
the ground that the doctrine of caveat emptor
barred T & E's claim.
On appeal, the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Appellate Division, noted that "many of today's
problems due to toxic waste are a result of yesterday's mistakes... for which yesterday's perpetrators must be held responsible." 546 A.2d at
575. Of the five issues raised by T & Eon appeal,
the court addressed only the issue of absolute or
strict liability. Under traditional tort doctrines,
(continued on page 28)

